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Money and Thinking: Reminders of Money
Trigger Abstract Construal and Shape
Consumer Judgments
JOCHIM HANSEN
FLORIAN KUTZNER
MICHAELA WA¨NKE
The idea of money reminds consumers of personal strength and resources. Such
cues have been found to increase the level of mental construal. Consequently, it
was hypothesized and found in five experiments that reminders of money trigger
abstract (vs. concrete) mental construals. Participants were primed with money or
money-unrelated concepts. Money primes caused a preference for abstract over
concrete action identifications (experiment 1), instigated the formation of broader
categories (experiment 2), and facilitated the identification of global (vs. local)
aspects of visual patterns (experiment 3). This effect extended to consumer judg-
ments: money primes caused a focus on central (vs. peripheral) aspects of products
(experiment 4) and increased the influence of quality of parent brands in evaluations
of brand extensions. Priming with a little money (experiment 3) or expenditures
(experiment 5) did not trigger abstract construals, indicating that the association
between money and resources drives the effect.
Whether or not the proverb “money makes the worldgo around” is true, money is undoubtedly a central
concept in modern consumer societies. Virtually every day,
consumers encounter money or symbols of money. They
earn, save, spend, or possibly lose money. They physically
touch and handle bills and coins. They are reminded of
money by proverbs (e.g., “a penny saved is a penny
earned”), songs (e.g., Money, Money, Money), or novel and
movie titles (e.g., The Color of Money). Given the impor-
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tance and the conspicuous nature of money in our lives in
general and in economic and consumer contexts in particular,
we consider it worthwhile to investigate the psychological
implications such reminders of money may have. In the
present research, we propose that the mental activation of
money affects people’s level of construal (experiments 1–
3), and we investigate respective implications for consumer
judgments (experiments 4–5).
Generally speaking, money can be regarded as a symbol
that is linked to many types of resources, such as security,
status, power, confidence, and freedom (Goldberg and Lewis
1978; Matthews 1991). For instance, money is strongly as-
sociated with the appraisal of confidence that one can suc-
cessfully deal with challenges in one’s environment: “money
provides a feeling of confidence that problems can be solved
and needs can be met” (Zhou, Vohs, and Baumeister 2009).
Likewise, money is associated with a “heightened sense of
autonomy” (Liu, Smeesters, and Vohs 2012) and the ability
to satisfy autonomy needs (Dewitte 2006). Accordingly it
was found, for instance, that mere thoughts of money make
people feel stronger as compared with participants in control
conditions (Zhou et al. 2009). Further, participants primed
with the concept of money asked for less help with a difficult
task (Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2006) and experienced less
social distress and physical pain (Zhou et al. 2009) than
participants of a control group. In sum, various evidence
This content downloaded from 134.155.85.149 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 04:45:36 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
MONEY AND THINKING 1155
suggests that the mere reminder of the concept of money
may relatively automatically signal that affordances in one’s
environment can be met and in turn elicits behavioral con-
sequences.
In different situations and with different consumers, how-
ever, money is associated either with personal strength or
with costs and threats. For instance, the financial situation
of a consumer might possibly influence what thoughts are
triggered by money. When money is short, one must think
carefully about what to buy and what not to buy, and
thoughts of money may rather trigger weakness instead of
confidence. Accordingly, Zhou et al. (2009) found that rec-
ollections of having spent money make people feel weaker
as compared with participants in control conditions. In other
words, depending on what associations money triggers, re-
minders of money can cause consumers to feel strong or
weak.
Crucially for the present research, perceiving oneself as
being able to master one’s environment or not should also
have cognitive consequences. In line with the assumption
that human cognition and processing style is adaptively
tuned to meet the situational requirements (Smith and Semin
2004, 2007), problematic environments or obstacles in goal
pursuit foster more detail-oriented, bottom-up processing
and low-level construal, whereas benign situations allow for
more abstract, top-down processing and high-level construal
(e.g., Schwarz 2002; Wegner and Vallacher 1986). For ex-
ample, when all goes well, one can focus on global goals
of behavior, but when a situation seems overtaxing, people
tend to mentally “downshift a gear” and construe actions
and events on a more concrete level, focusing on the specific
details and contextual information of a situation (Vallacher
and Wegner 1985, 1987, 1989; Wegner and Vallacher 1986).
The behavior of making coffee, for instance, may be con-
strued concretely as grinding coffee, putting grounds into
the machine, pressing the switch of the machine, and so on.
These steps in the behavioral chain represent the concrete
means of how to make the coffee. Alternatively, making
coffee may be represented abstractly as “getting a hot drink”
or “getting energized,” which corresponds to the general
gist of the behavior and conveys a more general understand-
ing of the behavior. Such abstract construals usually refer
to the goal or the end state of the behavior (by indicating
why a behavior is performed) rather than to its specific
means. They are more likely when the situational environ-
ment holds no threat for goal accomplishment (Vallacher
and Wegner 1985, 1987, 1989; Wegner and Vallacher 1986).
Of course, not only actions can be construed abstractly
versus concretely; representations of people (including the
self), objects, consumer products and events, as well, may
vary in their level of construal, which has important im-
plications for consumer judgments and decision making
(Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010;
for reviews in the consumer area, see Eyal, Liberman, and
Trope 2009; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). In any
case, signals of a benign environment as compared to a
challenging one foster more global, high-level construals,
because in face of threat or failure more attention to detail
is needed to master the situation. On the basis of this notion,
we assume that reminders of resources that help to overcome
potential challenges also trigger more global and less detail-
oriented processing.
It should be noted that even very subtle cues in the en-
vironment that are merely associated with relatively safe
versus threatening situations change the appraisal of the
situations and have an effect on construal level (Friedman
and Fo¨rster 2010). Such environmental cues can be colors
and faces signaling safety versus danger, or simple motor
actions associated with approach versus avoidance. The
color red (vs. gray), for instance, causes people to focus
more on concrete details instead of global stimuli as a whole
(Maier, Elliot, and Lichtenfeld 2008). Similarly, Burger and
Bless (2011) found that smileys versus frownies differen-
tially affected the abstractness level on which a political
decision situation is represented and thus influenced the rel-
evance of abstract idealistic concerns versus concrete prag-
matic concerns in political decision making. Importantly, the
level of construal changed in response to such appraisal cues
even without eliciting conscious experiences. Since certain
environmental cues influence construal level without coac-
tivating conscious emotional experiences, such cues have also
been called “implicit” (Friedman and Fo¨rster 2010).
In the present research, we tested whether reminders of
money serve as implicit cues that influence levels of mental
construal, as well as related consumer judgments and de-
cisions. Since money and wealth act as an implicit signal
that affordances can be met and because such a signal trig-
gers more abstract construals, we propose that the mental
activation of money (particularly, a great deal of money),
compared to activation of other equally ubiquitous concepts,
facilitates abstract construals of actions and objects.
H1: Reminders of (a great deal of) money facilitate
global, abstract mental construals.
We tested this hypothesis with a series of studies, bor-
rowing various experimental paradigms used in previous
research. The first set of studies (experiments 1–3) focuses
on the effect of money priming on mental construals in gen-
eral. Specifically, we tested whether money priming increases
the level of action identification, construal of categories, and
perceptual tuning. Two further studies (experiments 4 and 5)
address downstream implications for judgments that are cen-
tral in consumer contexts. Specifically, we investigate the
effect of money priming on the importance of central as
compared to peripheral features in the evaluation of a con-
sumer product (experiment 4) and on the evaluation of brand
extensions (experiment 5).
In many cases, reminders of money instigate an appraisal
of confidence and strength because money in general is
associated with wealth and strength. However, as mentioned
above, there are exceptions. That is, depending on the con-
text or on individual differences, money can have a com-
pletely different meaning. When thoughts about money re-
mind consumers of unpaid bills or their insufficient financial
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resources, for instance, money primes would indicate that
needs cannot be met and rather signal problems and chal-
lenges. Thus, the meaning of money should be an important
moderator of the money-priming effect proposed above. De-
pending on how money is framed, different associations are
activated (either with personal strength or with costs and
threats), and consequently, different levels of construal may
result. If reminders of money refer to expenditures, such as
prices or costs, instead of resources, they may not be ef-
fective in causing abstract construals or even trigger concrete
(instead of abstract) construals. Likewise, thinking about a
little money may not be sufficient in triggering abstract con-
struals.
H2: The meaning of the money prime moderates the
effect proposed above (hypothesis 1). That is, re-
minders of expenditure or a little money should
trigger more concrete mental representations com-
pared to reminders of money in general.
Such a moderation effect would additionally support the
idea that the possible effects of money cues on mental rep-
resentations are driven by money’s implicit signal. We tested
this framing prediction in two of the present studies, both
for the basic effect (experiment 3) and for consumer judg-
ments (experiment 5).
Importantly, as in previous research on money priming
(Vohs et al. 2006; Zhou et al. 2009; see also Vohs, Mead,
and Goode 2008), in the present research we treat “money”
as a particular economic concept—the idea of money—and
not as property. Thus, we do not address the effects of actually
possessing money, as has been investigated in research on
happiness or spending (Aaker, Rudd, and Mogilner, forth-
coming; Mogilner 2010; Srivastava, Locke, and Bartol 2001).
In the present research, we investigate whether the mere ac-
tivation of the concept of money (i.e., thoughts of money)
affects consumers’ mental construals and judgments.
MONEY AND ABSTRACT
MENTAL CONSTRUALS
Experiments 1–3 addressed the effect of money priming
on three indicators of abstract mental construals. Specifically,
we tested whether the activation of money instigates a more
abstract, high-level construal of actions (experiment 1),
whether money priming causes the construal of broader cat-
egories (experiment 2), and whether it facilitates more global
(vs. local) perceptions (experiment 3). In experiments 1 and
2, associations of money with abundance of resources were
primed (i.e., a great deal of money). In experiment 3, both
a great deal of money and a little money were primed.
Experiment 1: Money and Action Identification
In experiment 1, the concept of money (i.e., a great deal
of money and wealth) was primed with a sentence-descram-
bling task (Srull and Wyer 1979). Subsequently, the behav-
ioral identification form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner 1989)
was administered, which measures the abstractness level on
which actions are identified. We proposed that the level of
action identification would be higher (i.e., more abstract)
for participants in a money-primed condition than for par-
ticipants in a money-neutral control condition.
Method. Sixty-four students of various departments (26
female, 38 male) were randomly assigned (and counterbal-
anced for gender) to one of two conditions in a single-factor
(money priming vs. control group) between-subjects design.
Age ranged from 15 to 48 years (M p 25.56, SD p 5.88).
Participants were approached in the university cafeteria at
the University of Basel and asked to fill out a questionnaire
in exchange for a candy bar. After collecting some demo-
graphic data, the priming task was introduced as an inter-
national study to test playful methods for learning a lan-
guage, ostensibly administered for an institute in a different
city. Participants were provided with 30 word sets, each
consisting of five words. The participants were asked to
descramble each set by crossing out one word and writing
down a grammatically correct sentence with the remaining
four words. In the experimental condition, 20 of the 30
sentences included a word that was associated with a great
deal of money or resources (e.g., wealth, expensive, rich,
money, cashbox, treasure, bank notes, millionaire, earning,
jewels, paying, coins, discounts, price, and credit card). In
the control condition, we substituted these words with
money-unrelated words (e.g., Italy, loud, thin, industrious,
shutter, garden, ozone value, friend, singing, cans, ordering,
kiss, gifts, apology, and break). Funneled debriefing at the
end of the experiment revealed that no participant was sus-
picious about the purpose of the priming task.
After the priming task, participants worked on the BIF
(Vallacher and Wegner 1989). This test provides participants
with 24 actions (e.g., reading; see table 1) and two alter-
native descriptions of each action. One of the alternatives
always offers a description that emphasizes the concrete
means by which the action is performed (e.g., following the
lines of print). The other alternative is always more abstract
and emphasizes the end for which the action is performed
(e.g., gaining knowledge). For each action, participants were
asked to choose the description that expressed the action
better than the other. The proportion of abstract choices
served as the measure of abstract thinking. The entire study
took about 15 minutes.
Results and Discussion. For each participant, we cal-
culated the proportion of abstract action identifications.
These proportion scores were submitted to an F-test with
priming as independent variable. As predicted, participants
who had been primed with the concept of money had stron-
ger preferences for the abstract action identification (M p
.53, SD p 0.16) than participants in the control group (M
p .45, SD p 0.16; F(1, 62) p 4.041, p ! .05, p .061).2hp
Table 1 provides additional information about the distri-
bution of choices per item. The finding provides initial sup-
port of our hypothesis that reminders of money cause par-
ticipants to form more abstract construals—in this case, of
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS WHO PREFERRED THE ABSTRACT ACTION IDENTIFICATION AS A
FUNCTION OF PRIMING (EXPERIMENT 1)
Priming
Behavioral identification form item
Money
(n p 32)
Control
(n p 32)
Making a list: getting organized vs. writing things down 13 12
Reading a book: gaining knowledge vs. following lines of print 28 26
Washing clothes: removing odors from clothes vs. putting clothes into the machine 24 21
Picking an apple: getting something to eat vs. pulling an apple off a branch 8 8
Chopping down a tree: getting firewood vs. wielding an axe 13 5
Measuring a room for carpeting: getting ready to remodel vs. using a yardstick 21 19
Cleaning the house: restore cleanliness vs. vacuuming the floor 21 13
Painting the room: making the room look fresh vs. applying brush strokes 19 17
Paying the rent: maintaining a place to live vs. paying the bill 5 4
Caring for houseplants: making the room look nice vs. watering plants 5 4
Locking a door: securing the house vs. putting a key in the lock 24 17
Voting: influencing the election vs. marking a ballot 19 17
Climbing a tree: getting a good view vs. holding on to branches 21 18
Filling out a personality test: revealing what you’re like vs. answering questions 5 5
Brushing teeth: preventing tooth decay vs. moving a brush around one’s mouth 29 19
Taking a test: showing one’s knowledge vs. answering questions 14 15
Greeting someone: showing friendliness vs. saying hello 11 10
Resisting temptation: showing moral courage vs. saying “no” 16 12
Eating: getting nutrition vs. chewing and swallowing 29 25
Growing a garden: getting fresh vegetables vs. planting seeds 16 11
Driving by car: traveling to a destination vs. steering and changing gears 21 23
Having cavity filled: protecting the teeth vs. going to the dentist 10 6
Talking to a child: teaching a child something vs. using simple words 14 15
Pushing a doorbell: seeing if someone is home vs. pressing a button 23 24
events. Note that most words included in the descrambling
task were related to abundance of money or wealth. As a
consequence, thoughts about money as a resource were
primed, acting as implicit signal that affordances can be met,
which in turn may have triggered more abstract construals.
Experiment 2: Money and Category Breadth
Experiment 2 extended the findings of experiment 1 by
a different manipulation and a different measure of con-
strual, namely, the inclusiveness or breadth of categories.
When events are represented abstractly, consumers construe
the event in terms of global categories. That is, they build
fewer and broader categories when asked to classify diverse
objects into as many categories as they deem appropriate
(Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002, study 1). Accord-
ingly, we assumed that participants who had been primed
with money would build larger and fewer categories of
diverse objects of a list than participants in a control group
when asked to classify the objects into self-chosen cate-
gories.
Method. Forty-one students of various majors were ap-
proached in the university cafeteria at the University of Basel
and took part in this study in exchange for a coffee voucher.
They were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions
(priming: money vs. control). Two participants were ex-
cluded from the analyses because they failed to solve the
task correctly (i.e., they failed to classify three or more
words). The ages of the remaining 39 participants (25 fe-
male, 14 male) ranged between 19 and 29 years (M p 23.18,
SD p 2.96). As dependent measure we counted the number
of categories into which participants classified the objects.
Participants were introduced to a study on organizing
leisure activities and were asked to imagine that they were
going on a camping trip over the weekend. They received
a list of 37 camping-related objects. In the money condition,
this list contained six objects that were related to money
(i.e., purse, credit card, cash, traveler’s checks, coins, and
valuables). In the control group the money-related items
were replaced by articles of clothing (i.e., shirts, sweater,
coat, socks, pants, and underwear). The other 31 objects
were unrelated to money in both conditions (i.e., tent, sneak-
ers, soap, brush, matches, gloves, bathing suit, fishing pole,
hat, snorkel, raft, dog, boots, chocolate, blanket, flashlight,
sunglasses, shoes, knife, cigarettes, rope, bread, pillow, can-
teen, ax, toothbrush, beer, sleeping bag, insect repellent,
potato chips, and shovel). Participants were asked to place
the items that belonged together into groups by writing them
on the right of the list and circling them. They were in-
structed to classify every item into nonoverlapping groups.
To control for the possibility that the activation of money
may elicit positive mood, which in turn leads to more global
thinking (Gasper and Clore 2002), we also assessed mood
by two items that were to be answered on 7-point scales
that ranged from “very bad” to “very good,” and from “very
This content downloaded from 134.155.85.149 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 04:45:36 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1158 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
sad” to “very happy,” respectively. The entire study took
about 10 minutes.
Results and Discussion. Assuming that applying broader,
more abstract categorization would result in fewer categories,
the number of categories was used as the dependent variable.
Consistent with our prediction, a t-test for independent sam-
ples (priming: money vs. control) revealed that people used
significantly fewer categories to classify the objects when the
list contained money-related items (M p 7.50, SD p 1.70)
than when the list did not contain money-related items (M p
8.95, SD p 1.96; t(37) p 2.468, p p .018, p .14). Mood2hp
was not affected by priming (p 1 .17).
The finding that items were classified into fewer and
broader categories when money-related items were in the list
is consistent with our hypothesis that money facilitates ab-
stract mental construals. When primed with money, partic-
ipants construed the camping event in terms of relatively
high level, more inclusive categories compared with the
control condition.
Note that using clothing articles as control items estab-
lishes a rather conservative test of our hypothesis: money
items are clearly distinct from the other items, but clothing
articles are not (i.e., they possibly share a category with hat
and bathing suit). Therefore, ceteris paribus, we would ex-
pect participants to build fewer categories in the control
condition if money would not trigger abstract representa-
tions. On the other hand, one might argue that participants
started breaking down the large clothing category into finer
units as they realized how large the clothing category was,
resulting in more categories in the control condition, which
is an alternative explanation of the result in this study. Al-
though the alternative explanation is possible in principle,
in combination with the finding of experiment 1, an inter-
pretation favoring money as trigger of abstract construals
seems more likely. Nevertheless, to rule out this explanation,
we tested the effect with a different manipulation and a
different (i.e., response time–based) measure of construal
level in experiment 3.
Experiment 3: Money and Perceptual Processing
In experiments 1 and 2, we measured abstract construals
on a conceptual level (i.e., by level of action identification
and by breadth of categories). In experiment 3, we sought
to replicate the finding with a perceptual dependent variable.
We used a letter task by Navon (1977) to measure whether
participants focus more on global aspects of figures versus
specific aspects of figures when primed with money. In this
task (see also Fo¨rster et al. 2006), participants are presented
with a series of composite stimuli, each comprising a single
large letter composed of small letters. Participants were
asked to respond as quickly as possible to a target letter
(e.g., H) that appeared either at the global level (e.g., an H
composed of small L’s) or at the local level (e.g., an L
composed of small H’s). If thoughts of money trigger ab-
stract thinking, participants primed with money should be
faster in responding to global targets than to local targets,
compared to the control group.
Additionally, we primed a little money in this experiment
in order to test our second hypothesis. We assumed that
participants primed with a little money should show weaker
priming effects than participants primed with a lot of money
because a little money does not automatically signal that
affordances in one’s environment can be met. Moreover, we
included two different control conditions to rule out the
possibility that the effect of money priming on abstract con-
struals was due to specific control conditions in the previous
experiments.
Method. Fifty-six undergraduate psychology students from
the University of Basel (47 female, 9 male) took part in a
study on “reaction times” in exchange for course credit. Age
ranged from 18 to 26 years (M p 20.75, SD p 1.46).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four prim-
ing conditions (i.e., priming with pictures of bank notes,
small coins, flowers, or no priming). As mentioned above,
we used two control groups (i.e., a flower-picture group and
a no-priming group) in order to rule out the possibility that
the effect in experiments 1 and 2 could be attributed to the
specific control group in these studies instead of to the
money-priming group. Additionally, using pictures of flow-
ers that are evaluated as positive as pictures of money could
rule out a positivity effect as explanation of our findings.
On individual monitors, participants went through six
practice trials without any pictures and then 48 experimental
trials. Each experimental trial began with a fixation cross
(“”), which appeared for 500 milliseconds in the center
of the screen. Next, a photograph appeared on the screen
for 4 seconds. Depending on the experimental condition, this
photograph showed bank notes, small coins, or flowers. For
a fourth group of participants no pictures were presented.
In the three picture conditions we used a set of four different
pictures (i.e., four different photographs of bank notes, four
different photographs of small coins, or four different pho-
tographs of flowers), from which one was randomly selected
for each trial. After the picture, another 500-millisecond fix-
ation cross appeared, directly followed by a letter stimulus
that was displayed until the participant responded. If there
was no response within 3 seconds, the next trial began. The
intertrial interval was 2 seconds.
The letter stimuli were large letters composed of smaller
letters (e.g., a large H composed of small L’s, or a large F
composed of small H’s). Participants were instructed to in-
dicate as quickly as possible whether the whole stimulus
contained the letter T or the letter H, independently of
whether this letter appeared as a large or as a small letter.
Participants did this by pressing a respectively marked key
(T or H) on the keyboard. Each stimulus contained either a
T or an H but never both letters. Global targets were those
in which the decision-relevant letters (i.e., a T or an H) were
composed of smaller irrelevant letters (i.e., L’s or F’s). Local
targets were those in which an irrelevant letter (i.e., an L
or an F) was composed of smaller relevant letters (i.e., T’s
or H’s). Faster responses to global than local targets indi-
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FIGURE 1
AVERAGE RESPONSE TIMES (IN MILLISECONDS) AS A
FUNCTION OF PRIMING AND GLOBAL VERSUS LOCAL
TRIALS (EXPERIMENT 3)
NOTE.—Error bars indicate 1 SE.
cated a global (i.e., abstract) focus, whereas faster responses
to local than global targets indicated a local (i.e., concrete)
focus. Twenty-four local and 24 global targets were pre-
sented across six blocks, each of which included the four
possible global and the four possible local combinations
from the letters T/H and L/F in random order. Additionally,
as in experiment 2, participants’ moods were measured.
Results and Discussion. Response times to the letters were
logarithmically transformed. Trials with incorrect responses
(3.58% of all trials) and trials in which the response time
was more than 3 standard deviations from the mean for that
stimulus (1.04% of all trials) were excluded from the anal-
yses because extreme outliers could possibly bias the pattern
of results (Fazio 1990). The number of exclusions did not
vary by condition. We averaged each participant’s response
times for each target type (global vs. local) across blocks, target
letters (T and H), and irrelevant letters (L and F).
A 4 (priming: a great deal of money vs. a little money
vs. flowers vs. no priming) # 2 (target type: local vs. global)
ANOVA with repeated measurement on the second factor
revealed a main effect of the target type (F(1, 52) p 6.728,
p p .012, p .115), indicating that participants responded2hp
faster to global targets (M p 794.99 ms, SD p 176.69 ms)
than to local targets (M p 856.13 ms, SD p 221.42 ms).
This effect, however, was qualified by a significant inter-
action between target type and priming (F(3, 52) p 2.995,
p p .039, p .147; see fig. 1). The advantage of global2hp
targets over local targets occurred particularly when partic-
ipants saw photographs of a great deal of money (i.e., bank
notes; Mglobal p 755 ms, SD p 177 vs. Mlocal p 955 ms,
SD p 339; F(1, 13) p 5.912, p p .030, p .313, for2hp
the simple effect). Participants responded not significantly
faster to global than to local targets when they saw pho-
tographs of a little money (i.e., small coins; Mglobal p 836
ms, SD p 146 vs. Mlocal p 838 ms, SD p 129; F ! 1,
NS), of flowers (Mglobal p 777 ms, SD p 167 vs. Mlocal p
812 ms, SD p 144; F(1, 13) p 1.470, NS), or when they
saw no pictures between the letter trials (Mglobal p 812 ms,
SD p 183 vs. Mlocal p 819 ms, SD p 202; F ! 1, NS).
The effects remained significant when analyzing the data
with a 4 (priming: a great deal of money vs. a little money
vs. flowers vs. no priming) # 2 (target type: local vs. global)
# 2 (target letter: H vs. T) # 2 (irrelevant letter: F vs. L)
# 6 (blocks) ANOVA with repeated measurements on all
but the first factor, and including all reaction times (i.e., also
extreme reaction times and reaction times for incorrect re-
sponses; F(1, 52) p 6.146, p p .016, p .106 for the2hp
main effect of target type; F(3, 52) p 3.004, p p .039,
p .148 for the interaction between target type and prim-2hp
ing). As in experiment 2, mood was not affected by the
manipulation (F ! 1, NS).
The results of experiment 3 are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that reminders of money trigger abstract mental con-
struals as indicated by the facilitated processing of global
targets. Priming with a little money had no such effect, which
is a first indication that a little money is not sufficient to signal
that affordances in one’s environment can be met. Actually,
coins may even remind people of daily expenses—such as
buying a can of soda or paying for bus fare, which are related
to expenditures. Following this, we investigated the effect
of more direct expenditure primes in experiment 5 (i.e., price
tags). In sum, the findings of experiments 1–3 demonstrate
that reminders of (a sufficient amount of) money trigger
abstract construals both conceptually and perceptually.
CONSEQUENCES OF MONEY PRIMING
FOR CONSUMER JUDGMENTS
Although money as a very common economic concept is
interesting per se, thinking about money may even have
downstream effects in consumer contexts. In experiments 4
and 5, we therefore administered two different dependent
variables that are directly relevant in a broad spectrum of
consumer judgments and purchase decisions. We chose two
very diverse variables (i.e., feature weighting in product
evaluations, and evaluations of brand extensions) in order
to demonstrate the broad generalizability of the money-
priming effect and to show that money priming has impli-
cations in different consumer-related areas.
Experiment 4: Money and Feature Weighting
in Evaluations
Trope and Liberman (2000) suggested that the level of
mental construal affects choice and preferences. More spe-
cifically, an abstract mental construal enhances the impor-
tance of primary, central features of a product relative to its
secondary, peripheral features. In experiment 4, we tested
whether reminders of money would comparably increase the
impact of central aspects (i.e., the sound) compared with
peripheral aspects (i.e., the clock) of a product (i.e., a radio).
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FIGURE 2
AVERAGE PRODUCT EVALUATION AS A FUNCTION OF THE
FEATURE VALENCE AND PRIMING (EXPERIMENT 4)
NOTE.—The scale ranged from 1 to 7; higher values indicate better,
more favorable evaluations (1 SE).
In line with our hypothesis that money priming triggers
abstract construals, money priming should lead to a stronger
preference for products with favorable central and unfavor-
able peripheral features over products with favorable pe-
ripheral and unfavorable central features, compared to con-
trol groups.
Method. One hundred thirty-seven participants (92 fe-
male, 45 male) were recruited online via a weblist and within
the University of Heidelberg to take part in a study on
consumer judgments. The sample mainly consisted of stu-
dents (n p 132), and the age ranged from 18 to 54 years
(M p 22.96, SD p 5.61). Participants were randomly as-
signed to a 3 (prime type: money vs. music-control vs. shop-
ping-control) # 2 (feature valence: central feature-positive/
peripheral feature-negative vs. central feature-negative/pe-
ripheral feature-positive) between-participants design.
Participants first responded to demographic questions.
They were then exposed to one of three questions that served
as primes at the beginning of the study. In the money-prime
condition, participants were presented with a picture of
credit cards and a picture of cash. Additionally, to more
strongly activate the concept of money, participants were
asked to indicate which of the two options they preferred
as the medium of exchange. In the music-control condition,
participants were exposed to a picture of a radio and a picture
of CDs. Participants in this control condition were asked to
indicate which of the two they preferred when listening to
music. This control condition was intended as a very strict
test of the money-prime effect because, if anything, the mu-
sic-control condition should highlight the importance of the
central feature (i.e., the sound quality of a radio) and should
thus point in the same direction as the money prime. Ad-
ditionally, we included a second control condition in which
participants were exposed to the picture of a grocery store
and the picture of a laptop. These participants were asked
to indicate whether they preferred going shopping online or
in stores. This second control condition had the potential of
activating a consumption context without a direct reference
to money.
After being exposed to the primes, participants were asked
to imagine the purchase of a radio, comparable to the pro-
cedure by Trope and Liberman (2000, study 3). Participants
read one of two versions of this scenario in which either
the central feature was positive and the peripheral feature
negative, or vice versa. The central feature-positive/periph-
eral feature-negative version read as follows:
Imagine the following situation: You want to buy a radio, a
simple one to listen to music and news when you get up and
during breakfast. When you return with your new radio, it fits
where you wanted it to and has excellent sound. However, the
built-in clock is pretty useless. The display is so small that
you can’t even read the time when you are right next to it.
The central feature-negative/peripheral feature-positive
version read as follows:
Imagine the following situation: You want to buy a radio, a
simple one to listen to music and news when you get up and
during breakfast. When you return with your new radio, the
sound is very bad in the place you wanted to put it. For good
reception, only an inconvenient place remains. However, the
built-in clock is pretty useful. The display is pretty large, so
you can read the time from anywhere in the kitchen.
Directly afterward, participants indicated their evaluation
of the purchase on four 7-point scales (Cronbach’s a p
0.88). We used two items asking for satisfaction (i.e., “with
this purchase I would be very satisfied” and “with this pur-
chase I would be very happy”), one item asking for regret
(“I would regret this purchase”), and one item asking for
the subjective value concerning the purchase (“what I would
have spent for this radio now seems like a lot to me”). On
average, participants spent close to 2 minutes working on
the experiment (M p 1.93 minutes, SD p 0.79 minutes).
Results and Discussion. The mean evaluations were sub-
mitted to a two-factor ANOVA with the factors “prime type”
(money vs. music-control vs. shopping-control) and “feature
valence” (primary feature-positive/secondary feature-nega-
tive vs. primary feature-negative/secondary feature-posi-
tive). The analysis revealed a main effect of feature valence,
indicating a preference for the radio with the positive central
feature (i.e., the good sound; M p 4.02, SD p 1.12) as
compared to the radio with the negative central feature (M
p 2.80, SD p 1.11, F(1, 131) p 38.70, p ! .001, p2hp
.23). Additionally, this main effect was qualified by a mar-
ginally significant interaction between prime type and fea-
ture valence (F(2, 76) p 3.18, p p .092, p .04), in-2hp
dicating that the feature valence had a different impact in
different conditions. As visible in figure 2, feature valence
had a stronger impact on evaluations when participants had
been exposed to pictures of money than when they had been
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exposed to music-related or shopping-related pictures. In
order to directly test our hypothesis of the predicted money-
priming effect, we compared the difference between the two
feature-valence conditions in the money-prime condition
with the difference in the control conditions, using a planned
contrast (see Rosnow and Rosenthal 1989). The contrast
weights were set at 0.5 for the central feature-positive and
at 0.5 for the central feature-negative conditions for the
two control groups, and at 1 for the central feature-positive
and 1 for the central feature-negative conditions for the
money-prime group. The analysis revealed that the relative
preference for the good sound/bad clock radio over the bad
sound/good clock radio was larger in the money-prime con-
dition than in the control conditions (F(5, 136) p 9.20, p !
.001). This accentuating effect of money priming is also vis-
ible in the effect size of the feature-valence manipulation
being largest after a money prime (Msound good/clock bad p 4.51,
SD p 0.95 vs. Msound bad/clock good p 2.68, SD p 1.23; F(1,
42) p 30.83, p ! .001, p .42) as compared to the music-2hp
related control conditions (Msound good/clock bad p 3.81, SD p
1.32 vs. Msound bad/clock good p 2.97, SD p 1.25; F(1, 45) p
4.96, p ! .05, p .10) or shopping-related control conditions2hp
(Msound good/clock bad p 3.72, SD p 1.23 vs. Msound bad/clock good p
2.72, SD p 0.83; F(1, 44) p 10.44, p ! .05, p .19). The2hp
main effect of the prime type was not significant (F(2, 131)
p 1.22, NS).
These findings support the hypothesis that the money
prime, relative to the control primes, increased the impact
of relevant, central information, which can be expected when
participants represent products more abstractly. It may be
argued that the money prime in experiment 4 (i.e., money
and credit card pictures with the question, “what do you
prefer as the medium of exchange?”) is related more to
expenditures rather than to money. However, we think that
this is rather unlikely for the following reasons: (1) the
question did not directly refer to losing money and (2) the
question makes salient that one gets something for money
(“exchange”) at the same time. However, to test the differ-
ence of money versus expenditure primes more directly, we
primed these concepts less ambiguously in experiment 5.
Experiment 5: Money and the Evaluation of
Brand Extensions
So far our studies have shown that money priming elicits
more abstract construals, with consequences for weighting
of product features (experiment 4). In experiment 5, we test
whether money priming influences the evaluation of brand
extensions. Previous research has demonstrated that abstract
representations foster assimilation of target and context stim-
uli (Fo¨rster, Liberman, and Kuschel 2008). Building on the
inclusion/exclusion model (Bless and Schwarz 2010; Schwarz
and Bless 1992) that suggests that inclusion of target and
context in one category leads to assimilation, whereas ex-
clusion leads to contrast, Fo¨rster and colleagues (2008) ar-
gued that abstract (vs. concrete) mental construals facilitate
inclusion and thereby assimilation. Accordingly, abstract
construals promote inclusion of a brand extension into the
parent brand and thus assimilation of the evaluations of
extension and parent brand (Lu and Nayakankuppam 2010).
On the basis of this finding and our previous studies, we
proposed that reminders of money increase assimilation of
a brand extension to the brand beliefs compared to a control
condition. Moreover, according to hypothesis 2, we also
proposed that primes of costs or prices would instigate com-
parably more concrete construals and therefore lead to less
assimilation than reminders of money in general. To test our
assumption, we presented fictitious extensions for brands
with a favorable or an unfavorable image regarding quality.
Either pictures of money, prices, or neutral objects were
presented. We expected that brand extensions were rated
more favorably on quality dimensions when they pertain to
a high-quality brand than when they pertain to a low-quality
brand. The difference is particularly pronounced when
money had been primed but is less pronounced when prices
or neutral objects had been primed.
Method. Ninety participants (51 female, 39 male; age
range: 18–40 years, M p 22.96, SD p 3.70) were recruited
in the university cafeteria at the University of Basel and
were randomly assigned to a 3 (prime type: money vs. con-
trol vs. prices) # 2 (brochure control factor: brochure A
vs. brochure B; see the next paragraph) between-participants
design. Quality of parent brand was manipulated within par-
ticipants.
Two ad versions were created for each of six product cat-
egories. In one version the product was presented as an ex-
tension of a high-quality brand and in the other version as
an extension of a low-quality brand. The two ad versions only
differed in the brand name and depicted brand logo (e.g., Kia
vs. Mercedes). Each version was assigned to one of two bro-
chures (see table 2). In one brochure (brochure A) the ex-
tension products—gourmet magazine, perfume, and elec-
tronic notepad—were presented as extensions of high-quality
brands, and the other extension products—camping vans, vi-
deophones, and drinking glasses—were presented as exten-
sions of low-quality brands. The reverse was realized in the
second brochure (brochure B). Participants received either
brochure A or B, which constituted a control factor in our
design. The high-quality versus low-quality brands had been
selected according to a pretest. The order of the categories
was held constant for all participants (see table 2).
Participants were asked to rate each extension on several
7-point rating scales for expected quality. The rated dimen-
sions differed depending on the product category (see table
2 for the respective scales). The left page in the booklet
presented the ad. The respective rating scales were printed
on the right page. The instructions on the first page were
headed by the title “Consumer Study,” and next to the title
either money bills, price tags, or geometrical figures were
printed in color. The same depictions of money bills, price
tags, or geometrical figures were repeated on top of each
page containing the rating scales.
Each participant received one of the two brochures con-
taining the manipulation, stimuli, and rating scales. After
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TABLE 2
OVERVIEW OF THE MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 5
Control factor
Category of Brochure A: high-quality brands 1, 3,
Brochure B: low-
quality brands 1, 3,
Brand extension Parent band
5; low-quality brands
2, 4, 6
5; high-quality
brands 2, 4, 6
Quality measures (1 p dis-
agree; 7 p agree)
Gourmet magazine Newspapers High: NZZ Low: Blick The restaurant reviews are
reliable.
The magazine features rather
sophisticated recipes.
The magazine caters to an up-
market audience.
Camping vans Cars Low: Kia High: Mercedes The camping van is luxurious.
The camping van is technically
mature.
The camping van is high in
quality.
Perfume Fashion labels High: H&M Low: Orsay The perfume smells obtrusively
(reverse coding).
The perfume has a pleasant
scent.
Videophone Internet providers Low: Cablecom High: BlueWin The phone is technologically
mature.
The phone guarantees prob-
lem-free functioning.
The phone guarantees good
service.
The phone is highly reliable.
Electronic notepad Writing instruments High: Montblanc Low: Pelikan The notepad is of high quality.
The notepad is made of pre-
cious materials.
The notepad has an attractive
design.
Drinking glasses Bottled water Low: Bonaqua High: San Pellegrino The glasses are made of first-
class material.
The glasses look elegant.
The glasses look stylish.
The glasses have a classy
design.
NOTE.—The products were presented in order from top to bottom.
rating the product extensions, participants also rated the re-
spective parent brands (1 p negative, 7 p positive) as a
manipulation check.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check. One participant did not complete
the brand ratings, leaving 89 participants in this analysis. In
order to check whether the brand-quality manipulation was
successful, the ratings of the respective parent brands were
averaged and analyzed in a 2 (brand quality: high vs. low)
# 2 (brochure control factor: A vs. B) factorial ANOVA
with the first factor as within-participants factor and the
second factor as between-participants factor. Only the main
effect of brand quality was highly significant (F(1, 86) p
180.549, p ! .001, p .677); high-quality brands were2hp
evaluated more positively than low-quality brands (M p
5.13, SD p 0.87 vs. M p 3.61, SD p 0.94). This effect
was independent of the brochure control factor (F ! 1).
Separate analyses for each priming condition also revealed
that the manipulation of brand quality was equally successful
in all three priming conditions (all p ! .001).
Evaluation of Brand Extensions. Ratings for each ex-
tension were averaged into one score (Cronbach’s a between
.61 and .81). These compound scores were then analyzed
in a mixed-factors ANOVA with prime and brochure control
factor as between-participant factors and brand quality as
within-participant factor. The three-way interaction was not
significant (F ! 1). Overall, extensions from high-quality
brands were rated as superior in quality (M p 4.13, SD p
0.73) than extensions from low-quality brands (M p 3.69,
SD p 0.87; F(1, 84) p 17.114, p p .001, p .169). As2hp
expected, this main effect of brand quality was qualified by
the primes (F(2, 84) p 3.703, p p .029, p .081; see2hp
fig. 3). Participants who were primed with money evaluated
extensions from high-quality brands more positively and
those of low-quality brands more negatively compared to
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FIGURE 3
AVERAGE QUALITY RATING AS A FUNCTION OF QUALITY OF
PARENT BRAND AND PRIMING (EXPERIMENT 5)
NOTE.—The scale ranged from 1 to 7; higher values indicate more
favorable ratings (1 SE).
participants primed with price (F(1, 57) p 4.184, p ! .045,
p .068 for the two-way interaction) and compared to a2hp
control group (F(1, 55) p 8.164, p ! .006, p .129 for2hp
the two-way interaction). Further analysis showed that brand
quality only had a large and significant effect for money
priming (all M p 4.21 vs. 3.39; all SD p 0.65 and .76;
F(1, 28) p 36.796, p ! .001, p .568) but not for price2hp
priming (all M p 4.09 vs. 3.78; all SD p 0.83 and 0.85;
F(1, 29) p 2.406, p 1.13) or the control group (all M p
4.07 vs. 3.92; all SD p 0.71 and 0.93; F ! 1). The difference
between the average evaluations of the low-quality brand
extensions and the high-quality brand extensions did not
differ between the two brochures (F ! 1 for the brand quality
by brochure interaction).
The results demonstrate that participants were more likely
to base their evaluation of the brand extensions on their
beliefs about the parent brand when participants had been
primed with money than when they had been primed with
price or neutral objects. The same product was rated more
favorably when it was presented as an extension from a
brand enjoying a positive image compared to a brand with
a less positive image. Presumably, being reminded of money
triggered abstract construals of the stimuli as shown in ex-
periments 1–3. This in turn promoted inclusion of the ex-
tension into the mental representation of the brand and
thereby allowed the transfer of (positive or negative) brand
beliefs (Bless and Greifeneder 2009). Reminders of price,
in contrast, presumably instigated a rather concrete repre-
sentation that undermined reliance on the brand image.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across five experiments, we tested the hypothesis that the
activation of the concept money—compared with the acti-
vation of equally prevalent control concepts—triggers ab-
stract mental construals. The findings of experiments 1–3
demonstrated that participants who were primed with money
identified behaviors on a higher level of abstractness, were
more inclusive in their categorization, and processed visual
stimuli on a more global level than participants of respective
control groups. Experiments 4 and 5 addressed the relevance
of money priming for consumer related judgments and
choices. In experiment 4, participants who were asked a
question that directly involved money weighted relevant and
central product information higher than participants who
were asked questions that were unrelated to money. Exper-
iment 5 showed that money priming led to assimilation ef-
fects in the evaluation of brand extensions.
Interestingly, the effect of money priming on abstract
mental construals was eliminated when participants were
primed with a little money (experiment 3). This finding
indicates that a certain amount of money needs to be primed
in order to create the effect. Apparently, a little money is
not sufficient as a cue that signals resources to meet chal-
lenges. Experiment 5 provided further support for this hy-
pothesis by showing that the way in which money is framed
makes a difference; participants who were primed with
prices assimilated less to the parent brand than participants
who were primed with money.
Using a variety of abstractness measures as well as mul-
tiple methods of priming the concept of money, we found
consistent evidence that merely activating money changed
people’s mental representations. In contrast to money, var-
ious equally prevalent control primes, such as flowers,
clothes, music, geometric figures, and a mixture of diverse
concepts, did not have comparable effects. In addition, price
primes triggered comparably more concrete mental repre-
sentations than money primes.
This latter finding is particularly interesting because it sug-
gests that the effect of money priming on the level of con-
strual may be moderated by several factors. Depending on
the context or on individual differences, money can have
different meanings. That is, thoughts of money can be as-
sociated with personal strength or with costs and threats in
different situations and across different consumers. It is very
likely that such different representations of money change
the effects. For instance, the financial situation of a partic-
ipant might possibly influence what thoughts are triggered
by money. When money is short, on the one hand, one must
think carefully about what to buy and what not to buy;
thoughts of money may rather trigger weakness instead of
confidence and thus may not be able to induce abstract
mental construals. Wealth and luxury, on the other hand, is
related to abstract thinking (Hansen and Wa¨nke 2011). Fu-
ture research may further explore the effects of the different
associations money may provoke.
Interestingly, recent research found that consumer pref-
erences are less consistent when prices are included in prod-
uct decisions (Lee, Bertini, and Ariely 2010). Reminders of
the “pain of paying” may lead consumers to represent the
products more concretely, resulting in greater preference
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inconsistencies (which are related to concrete construals;
Ledgerwood, Trope, and Liberman 2010). According to our
findings, we would predict that money and wealth primes
(instead of price primes) would cause more consistent prod-
uct decisions. Accordingly, Lee and colleagues did not find
inconsistent preferences after price priming for consumers
who regard high prices as a quality feature and who thus
are not reminded of “pain of paying” after price priming
(Lee et al. 2010, experiment 5b).
Our finding that reminders of (plenty of) money facilitate
abstract mental construals may also contribute to under-
standing the effects of money priming on self-sufficiency
(Vohs et al. 2006) and an increased focus on the self (Reutner
and Wa¨nke, forthcoming). Previous research has shown that
abstract construals increase perceived social distance (Lib-
erman and Fo¨rster 2009). Thus, money priming may in-
crease a perception of social distance by triggering abstract
construals, which may partly contribute to the effect that
money priming causes participants to distance themselves
from other people by taking a self-sufficient orientation,
sitting farther away from others, and caring more about
themselves than about others. Alternatively, because the idea
of money reminds people of sufficient resources to master
their environment (Boucher and Kofos 2012; Zhou et al.
2009) and because greater resources reduce the need to rely
on other people, reminders of money may lead to greater
self-sufficiency. In principle, both processes can occur in
parallel. Future research may further explore why money
priming increases self-sufficiency.
We did not find that money priming affected participants’
mood, which indicates that reminders of money may not
have activated conscious affective experience. Although our
studies were not primarily intended to test mood as a me-
diator of effects of money priming, for several reasons our
results do not provide evidence in favor of conscious feel-
ings as a possible account. First, in some of our studies,
participants in the control condition were also provided with
stimuli that may enhance mood, such as the expectation of
a camping trip in experiment 2, or pictures of flowers in
experiment 3. Second, as mentioned above, mood was mea-
sured in many of our experiments. The results showed that
mood was not affected by priming money. Finally, when
controlling for mood as a covariate in those experiments in
which mood was measured, the effect of money priming on
abstract construal remained unchanged.
At present, research on abstract versus concrete mental
construals is accumulating at a fast rate (e.g., Eyal et al.
2009; Hansen and Trope, forthcoming; Hansen and Wa¨nke
2010; Liberman and Trope 2008; Liberman, Trope, and
Stephan 2007; Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010; Trope et
al. 2007). The present research adds money as one con-
sumption-related factor that triggers abstract construals. In
combination, recent research findings and the effects of
money priming leads us to believe that there may be other
outcomes that money can elicit. For instance, abstract think-
ing has been demonstrated to increase self-control (Fujita
et al. 2006). Participants who had been primed with a high-
level, abstract construal orientation squeezed a handgrip (os-
tensibly to receive self-relevant information) for a longer
duration than participants who had been primed with a low-
level construal orientation. Given that money priming fa-
cilitates abstract construals, it might be possible that money
priming also enhances the ability to practice self-control.
Support for this idea comes from studies demonstrating that
the concept of money can buffer ego-depletion effects: typ-
ically, participants who complete an initial task that depletes
self-control resources show lower self-control in a second
task that also requires self-control. This effect, however,
disappears when people are reminded of money, suggesting
that money priming enhances self-control resources (Bou-
cher and Kofos 2012).
Impatience is related to self-control in consumer contexts.
It has been shown that consumers prefer smaller but sooner
rewards over larger but later rewards, especially when the
rewards are temporally proximal (Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue 2002; Thaler 1981). For example, con-
sumers prefer one apple today over two apples tomorrow,
but they prefer two apples in 31 days over one apple in 30
days (Malkoc and Zauberman 2006; Thaler 1981). That is,
preference reverses as the delayed choice draws nearer (i.e.,
the “present bias”). Interestingly, because the present bias
is partly driven by a more concrete and more contextual
representation of near decisions, an abstract processing
mind-set evoked in an unrelated task decreases the extent
of contextual thinking and thus attenuates the present bias
in subsequent decisions (Malkoc, Zauberman, and Bettman
2010). As reminders of money facilitate abstract information
processing, merely thinking of money in a previous situation
might also reduce the extent of present bias in subsequent
decisions. One may argue that much of the evidence about
temporal discounting and the present bias comes from de-
cisions involving money. Here, additional money priming
may not have an effect. However, money priming in a pre-
vious task might be sufficient to reduce the present bias for
decisions that involve resources other than money.
The present findings demonstrate that money primes af-
fect consumers’ evaluation of products on the basis of prod-
uct descriptions. Additionally, previous research has shown
that increasing the experiential contact with a product trig-
gers more concrete mental construals of a product and in-
creases preferences for products with positive peripheral fea-
tures, such as products that are easy to use relative to those
that are more desirable but difficult to use (Hamilton and
Thompson 2007). Because sometimes consumers do not fo-
cus enough on peripheral features (relative to central fea-
tures) when making a product choice, they are often dis-
satisfied when they use the product later (Hamilton and
Thompson 2007). If primes of money lead to even more
abstract representations of a product in a choice situation,
they may accentuate this gap in consumers’ preferences and
contribute to less-satisfying product experiences later. In
contrast, when thinking about money during product ex-
perience, more central features (which were also important
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in the choice situation) may be part of the representation of
the product, thereby reducing the preference gap.
It has been found that the temporal distance of the attitude
of an object systematically influences the strength of par-
ticular persuasive appeals (Fujita et al. 2008). Similarly, we
suggest that money priming causes people to preferentially
attend to arguments that advertise products with its primary
features (i.e., those that focus on aspects of desirability of
the object, such as taste or quality) compared to arguments
that advertise products with its secondary features (i.e., those
that focus on aspects of feasibility, such as availability).
Thus, advertisements that feature desirability-related argu-
ments should be more effective than feasibility-related ar-
guments when consumers are reminded of money.
These and other hypotheses should be tested in further
research. Given that money and symbols of money are omni-
present and conspicuous in our daily consumer environment,
it is important to note their psychological implications. The
current research adds a piece to this research topic, which
we are only beginning to explore.
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